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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Case No. 20080480-SC

vs
GARETH BOZUNG,
Defendant / Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(i).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following provisions, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum of the
Appellant's Brief pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(b)(2):
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V; UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Where the trial court examined a video taped recording of Defendant's interview with
police, including the alleged mirandizing, and made findings of fact based on that video,
did the court erroneously find that the State had failed to show by a preponderance of
evidence that Defendant had been adequately warned of his Fifth Amendment rights and

1

that the State had failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that Defendant had
knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights?
2. Where trial court suppressed Defendant's statements taken in violation of Miranda, did
the court commit obvious error and abuse its discretion in applying Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure in denied the State's motion for rehearing?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bozung offers only a brief supplement to the Statement of the Case presented in the
State's Brief that should follow immediately after the end of the State's summary on page
11:
Following the trial court's denial of the State's motion for a rehearing the State filed a
petition to appeal that was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 98). The State then
filed a motion to dismiss noting that the trial court's order suppressing Bozung's
statements substantially impaired the State's case against him (R. 99). Following the
order of dismissal the State filed this appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Handing the Admonition of Rights form to Bozung and instructing him to initial
and sign it did not constitute and adequate recitation of Miranda rights in this case. Even
if Bozung is found to have been adequately warned, the State has not met its heavy
burden of showing that Bozung waived his Miranda rights.
The trial courts application of Rule 24 to the State's motion for rehearing did not a
plain error on the part of the trial court because either the application of the rule was
9

appropriate and no error at all, the error was not obvious, or the denial of the motion for
the reasons discussed by the court were within the court's discretion.

ARGUMENT
In its brief the State presented two main arguments. First, that the trial court erred
in granting Bozung's motion to suppress his interview with the police after his arrest.
Second, that the trial court erred when it applied the newly discovered evidence standard
of Rule 24 to the State's motion to reopen the suppression hearing. Bozung responds to
those arguments in turn.

I. The trial court acted within its discretion where it found that Bozung was not
adequately advised of his Miranda rights and rights and never waived his Fifth
Amendment privileges.
Examining a violation of Miranda rights is a two-step process. The State has
correctly noted that "once warnings are given, a defendant may waive his Miranda rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Appellant's Brief
at 17 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 86 S.Ct 1602, 1612, L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Accordingly this Court must first
determine whether the warnings were properly given before it can determine whether or
not waiver was both voluntary and intelligent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. Here,
the trial court correctly found that Bozung did not receive an adequate warning and thus
any pretext of waiver found in the Admonition of Rights form presented by the State is
manifestly invalid.
As Bozung argued at the trial level, State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Ut.App. 1993)
3

stands for three principles, each relevant and highly persuasive in this case: First, all
persons must be warned by the police of their Miranda rights before interrogation.
Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72). Second, simply asking
an accused if he understands those rights does not substitute for an adequate recitation of
those rights. Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358, n. 10. And third, an accused cannot knowingly
waive Miranda rights unless he has first been adequately advised of those rights by the
police. (R. 58), Id. These principles must be considered when analyzing this case
because much of the State's argument is based on a presumption that Miranda was
properly presented which runs contrary to this Court's decision in Snyder. Bozung
asserts the trial court correctly suppressed his statements for two interrelated yet distinct
reasons: One, the trial court found that Bozung was not adequately advised of his
Miranda rights because he was not sufficiently warned verbally by Detective Moosman
nor by his own reading of the written Admonition of Rights form (R. 81). Two, the trial
court found that Bozung did not knowingly waived his Miranda rights upon signing of
the Admonition of Rights form (R. 81).

A. Adequate Recitation of Miranda Warnings:
"The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege
so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was
aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior

4

contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. See also Snyder, 860 P.2d at 357. Without some valid form of
recitation a custodial interrogation violates Miranda regardless of an individual's
personal familiarity with those rights. The State was obligated to show that Bozung was
properly warned and Bozung agrees with the trial court's finding that a proper recitation
did not occur (R. 82).
The video recording of the interrogation clearly supports that finding. From the
video it is clear that Bozung was in a highly agitated and emotional state at the time he
was interrogated by Detective Moosman. Bozung was crying, complaining of his
"broken heart" over his friend's death (R. 126:13:37:01). Moosman then told Bozung
that he wanted to talk about Josh, and that because Bozung had been arrested Moosman
needed to go through his rights with him (R. 126:13:37:48, 13:38:02). After stating that
Bozung had the right to remain silent and saying the he "just need[ed] [Bozung] to initial
number one" Moosman discontinued the recitation (R. 126:13:38:11). Bozung told
Moosman "I can just read it, he just read me my rights." (R. 126:13:38:16). Moosman
said "ok that's fine, if you'll read it, if you understand 'em intitial by 'em." (R.
126:13:38:16, 83). Bozung then immediately began talking about other things at a time
when he was supposed to be being warned about his fundamental Fifth Amendment
privileges (R. 83). Moosman did not return to the subject matter of the rights but just
directed Bozung to the portions of the form he needed to sign or initial to 'complete' the
form (R. 83, 82).
The State contends that since Bozung was experienced with the criminal justice

system, he volunteered to read his rights himself, completed the form and confirmed that
he understood, he was adequately warned. Appellant's Brief at 15. However, no amount
of prior familiarity with ones rights will alleviate the need to be warned prior to
interrogation. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Ut.App. 1993) (citing cases where
defendants' status as deputy sheriff, police officer, attorney and habitual criminal did not
alleviate requirement for adequate warning of rights prior to interrogation). See also
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. "As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning [the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during interrogation] is an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may
have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead." Miranda at 471.
Accordingly the trial court found that the "defendant's attention was very clearly
divided" and "nothing before me [] persuades me that he paid absolute attention to what
he was doing... [everything I have persuades me he did not." (R. 121: 23).
The State cites United States v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120, 1122 (4th Cir. 1977)
proposing that "it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda... be given in
oral rather than written form." Appellant's Brief at 16. Bozung does not assert that a
proper recitation would have required Moosman to recite the Miranda rights orally.
However, Bozung does allege in this case that the mere existence of the Admonition of
Rights form is insufficient to establish an adequate recitation of the Miranda warnings.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the video is not clear as to whether Bozung actually read
the warnings. The trial court's findings that Bozung "did not focus exclusively on the
6

admonitions" and that Bozung "was distracted from the admonitions on the form by the
matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman" were supported by the video evidence
that he was talking constantly to Moosman and frequently looking upon from the form at
Moosman. Furthermore, Moosman never returned to his attempt to orally recite the
warnings and allowed Bozung to continue to talk about other subjects as he gave the
Admonitions form a cursory glance. Therefore, the State did not meet its burden of
showing that the Miranda rights were properly delivered.
Bozung was not adequately warned about his Miranda rights. The State's
argument that he was given the Admonition of Rights form and had the opportunity to
read it is not sufficient to establish an adequate warning. Because Bozung was not
warned the State's claims that the trial court incorrectly ruled on the issue of waiver is
irrelevant. Without a proper warning any alleged waiver is impossible.

B. Sufficient Waiver of Miranda Rights:
If this Court concludes that the trial court's finding that the warning was
inadequate, Bozung maintains that his initials and signature on the Admonitions of Rights
form did not constitute a valid waiver in this case. If, after the warnings have properly
been given, "the interrogation continues without a the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda at 475 (citing Escobedo v. State
of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)).

Here, after Bozung initialed the Admonition of Rights form Moosman proceeded
to interview Bozung without an attorney and Bozung's statements constitute the entirety
of the case against him. At the suppression hearing the State therefore bore the heavy
burden of proving the validity of the alleged waiver. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,
1211 (Ut.App. 1987) (the defendant is given the benefit of every reasonable presumption
against finding a waiver), North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755,
1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) ("The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive
his rights; the prosecution's burden is great...").
The State, in its brief, cites State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Ut.App. 1983)
noting that this Court "review[s] for clear error the trial court's findings of fact
underlying the waiver." The clear error standard requires the State to show that the trial
court's findings of fact are so lacking support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence thus making them clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987). Thus, in order to find a valid waiver this Court must be convinced that the
evidence does not support the trial court's factual findings. This Court must find that the
trial court's factual findings relative to Bozung's and Moosman's behavior at the
interrogation are unsupported despite the video evidence that Bozung was distracted, that
he did not focus on the form while signing it, and that Detective Moosman did not read
Bozung or ensure that Bozung read his Miranda rights or the waiver. Even if this Court
would have made different findings were the evidence being reviewed de novo, the clear
error standard prevents this Court from rejecting the trial court's findings because they
are not clearly erroneous.
8

After lllis matter came before the trial court for oral argument, and after reviewing
ll le video of tl ic polic 2 ir itci * no v., t! 1 : tit ial coi irt ei itei 2d its I hidings of fact, conch isions of
law and order granting Bozung's motion to suppress admissions (R. 85). The trial court
found that, after discussing the right to remain silent, "Det. Moosman did not advise
:

Defer-

:|\ .ncnn\ , :•

form and

place his initials beside certain paragraphs in sequences thai j were J uncertain" (R. 84,
83). The court further found that Bozung "did not stop talking about [] unrelated issues
diiring the entire time he looked over the [Admonition 01 knJii>>j u>n*" (K

icse

factual findings, suppoi ted 1:>) ' cleai v ideo evidei ice, led tl le ti ial
matter of law that Bozung did not knowingly and intentionally waive his Fifth
Amendment rights (R 81)
1 1 le State claii 1 is 1 1 ial il tl le totality of the :ii ci 1:1 1 istances demonstrates that a
defendant had the requisite level of comprehension a court may conclude that the waiver
was valid. Appellant's Brief at 17 (emphasis added) citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 IJ S.
412,4.

.

•*

. ;• a . ourt finds knowing

and intelligent waiver from the totality of the circumstances a trial com t has the
discretion to find that Miranda rights have been waived. The State then relies on relevant
ci ii ci il nstai ices, si icl 1 as a defendant's intelligence and education, age and familiarity with
the criminal justice system, and the proximity of the w aivei to the giving of • I iu c mt la
warnings, to argue that under the totality of the circumstances Bozung waived his rights
(R 18).

o

However, when articulating those relevant circumstances in detail the State's brief
focuses on Bozung's "extensive prior experience with the criminal justice system." (R.
19). While Bozung agrees that prior experience with the criminal justice system may be
potentially relevant to a suspect's understanding of the Miranda rights he claims that
merely asserting that he has experience with the system does not necessarily prove any
familiarity with Miranda, because, as Officer Moosman admitted, "under most
circumstances" Miranda rights are not discussed, nor suggest that he understood those
rights (R. 126:13:38:03).
Moreover, courts have found that prior arrests and experience with the justice
system are insufficient to establish that defendants are aware of their Miranda rights.
United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507, 514 (8th Cir. 1983). The Miranda
Court went even further when it said that "[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that
the person may have been aware of th[ese] right[s] will stand in its stead (referring to an
explicit recitation)." Miranda at All All.

The State's claim that the totality of the

circumstances analysis should be influenced by Bozung's prior criminal history ignores
the mandates of Miranda because the rest of the evidence, and the court's factual
findings, support the conclusion that Bozung did not knowingly waive his rights.
The State claims that "nothing in the record... supports findings that the
Defendant was only pretending to read the Form" other than the fact that he was talking
to Moosman during the time he was supposed to be reading the form. Appellant's Brief at
21. This assertion ignores not only the burden the State bears in proving waiver but also
the simple facts demonstrated by the video recording. The State bears the heavy burden
10

to overcome the presumption that Bozung did not waive his rights and the trial court
recognized this burden In luimnliitin;.' its conclusions in llic negative. The court ruled
that it "was not persuaded... that the Defendant... was adequately advised11 of his rights
and that it "was not persuaded... that Defendant knowingly waived his" rights (R. 81)
As sh< *

•

"ii'• i

.\

Aih' nMHi. led to read the rest of the

form at 13:38:18. At 13:40:29, two minutes eleven, secoi ids later, Bozi mg reti in is tl le
form to Moosman. Of that two minutes eleven seconds approximately 86 of those
seconcf

u\: snont talking to Moosman1 many of which Bozung was actually looking up at

Moosman oi luuumg nis face.
Citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) the State contends that
"[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver
ofih.it n . m n

is usually strong proof of the validity

Apfu II,nil \ lim/f a( I ' Mo/ung icsponds bv encouraging this Court to

continue reading where the U.S. Supreme Court noted that an express waiver is i leithei
"necessary or sufficient to establish waiver... The question is ilot one of form, but rather
whetl ici tl ic defei idai it ir i fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in
the Miranda case." Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Where the < 'miri luis the ahilKv in ,n hulk
witness the circumstances surrounding the interrogation presumptions of validity based
on a written waiver are less helpful because the Court may actually witness the recitation
and the suspect's reaction to il lit llns c;ise the fail Ilium Bo/img iiiiliitlnj ;im.l signed flic

1

Approximately 37 seconds between 13:38:21 and 38:58, 5 seconds between 13:39:Q3
and 39:08, 17 seconds 13:38:13 and 38:30, 7 seconds between 13:39:37 and 39:44. 10
seconds between 13:39:49 and 39:59, 7 seconds between 13:40:01 and 40:08, and 3
seconds between 13:40:12 and 40:15.
11

Admonition of Rights form should not overshadow the circumstances surrounding the
alleged waiver that the trial court found unpersuasive.2 As mentioned by the State, a
waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was "made with a full awareness of both the nature
of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them]."
Appellant's Brief at 17 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135,
1140(1986)).
The trial court examined the video and the court took detailed notes relating to the
conduct both of Moosman and Bozung. The court then made findings of fact based on
the video. Those findings of fact should be upheld because they are not clearly
erroneous. The conclusion of law that Bozung did not knowingly and intentionally waive
his Miranda rights is also not in error and as such should be upheld by this Court. The
State's claim that the clear weight of the evidence is against the trial court findings is not
reflected in the evidence. Bozung urges this Court to review the evidence and the trial
court's findings and conclusions and uphold the trial court's decisions.

II. The trial court's denial of the State's motion to reopen the suppression hearing
was not an error because it was either proper, not obviously erroneous or was
within the court's broad discretion.
The State appeals the trial court's decision to apply Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Motion for a New Trial, to the State's motion to reopen the
suppression hearing. On October 30, 2007 Bozung filed a motion to suppress statements
"This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his
statements would be used against him in court, or knew that he could stop the
interrogation at any time." (R. 81).
12

m a d e during a M a y 1, 2 0 0 7 interview with Detective M'oosii lai i (R 39) A,f ter an
evidenciary hearing, briefing, a status hearing and oral arguments, the trial court entered
HI iJidi i suppiessing B o z u n g ' s statement made to Detective M o o s m a n on M a y 1, 2007
(R. 80). The State then filed a i i lotion I o:i i elieai it ig • ; i i t.i ite si lppression i notion alleging
that it would like to present evidence of a prior recitation oi Miranda (R. 70). The trial
court found that the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically provide for a
motio:

* • -•

is recogni

Procedure (R. 122:6, 88, 87). Judge Laycock ruled that because there was no rule on
point the closest rule would be Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
n n r r s reqiiCMl lm t \w\\ w i nl

: «;.-.;

the State's request for a rehearing finding diai tl;

<^irt applied Rule 24 and denied
*

<1

pei'Mmdul

ate

could not have produced the relevant evidence at the original suppression hearing (R. 87,
86)

A. The trial court did not commit obvious error in applying Rule 24
This ruling was not challenged before the trial court and thus, according to the
State's bi ief to pi e ^ ' ail or i appeal tl le State must demonstrate that the ;i iai court
committed plain error on its ruling. Appellant's Brief at 23, In oi dei for the sn lppi ession
of evidence to constitute plain error, the State must demonstrate that " ( 0
0

an error

exists;

have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,

absent the error, there is a i € asoi lable Iikjel.il lood of a i it lore fa/v orable ::MI itcon ic • " Sti ih ? v.
McClellan,

2009 U T 50, f 32 citing State v. Ross, 2007 U T 89, \ 17, 174 i \ 3 d 628.

i. There was no error
The State has argued that applying Rule 24 was an error because the rule, by its
terms, only applies after a final judgment. Appellant's Brief at 24-25. According to the
State's brief, the trial court committed an error because the State's motion to for
rehearing was not filed to upset any final judgment of conviction. Id. In his response to
the State's motion for rehearing Bozung characterized the State's motion as a motion to
reconsider (R. 73). Because motions for rehearing and motions to reconsider are not
recognized in the rules of procedure this Court has construed such motions as motions for
new trial, just as the trial court did. An example is found in State v. Gardner, 23 P.3d
1043 (Utah 2001), where the defendant, after a motion to suppress statements was denied,
moved to reconsider his motion to suppress in order to introduce evidence. This Court
noted that "we construe defendants motion for reconsideration in this case as a motion
for new trial." Gardner, 23 P.3d at 1045. The trial court, based on precedent from this
Court, construed the State's motion for rehearing as a motion for new trial and applied
the "criteria under which a motion for a new trial may be brought" from Rule 24 and
found the motion lacking. Id. Bozung contends that ruling was not an error.
An examination of State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Ut.App. 1989), provides more
insight into the court's application of Rule 24 to the State's motion to reopen the
suppression hearing. In Johnson the Utah Court of Appeals applied Rule 24 to a motion
by the State to reopen a preliminary hearing. Johnson had been charged with vandalism
of construction equipment and the trial court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence
to support vandalism counts so the charges were dismissed. The State then moved to
14

reopen the prelim inn rv h c a n i n ' "adnnilini* lh.il he II.MI iiiiiniciitly miscalculated the
quantum o f e v i d e n c e necessary to s h o w probable cause." State v. Johnson,

782 f} 2d at

; he State also c l a i m e d it "had n e w e v i d e n c e inculpating Johnson." Id.
IV:

his c a s e , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t in ,Johnson ruled that a

motion to reopen a preliminary hearing "serves no ptiipn ,r uthri Ih m In m|msi \\\V tual
court to reconsider its order of dismissal." fti Johnson the State's failure to produce the
necessary c\ idnu c in stippmi ,i finding of probable cause resulted in a dismissal. Here,
the State's failure to produce enough evident, n! Munndii resulted mi ,i disnnsi.il

I In.

fact that the State's failure in Johnson occurred at a preliminary hearing and the State's
fail

occurred at a suppression hearing is of little consequence because the

evidence supporung pinbable cause in iiin\ i ase uas based cniircly ^MON die statements
made to Detective Moosman during the May 1, 2009 interrogation (i

l

)

When those statements were suppressed there remained no other evidence supporting
Bozuiiji/s proset niimi A\n\ iihn case was effective < though not technically, dismissed.
A request to reconsider a final order oi uismi:

i

meets the requirements of a motion under Utah R.Crim.P. 24 for a new trial." Johnson,
782 I1" "d i\\ S M lio/uug claims that the State's motion for a rehearing on the
suppression motion following the suppression nf his sfalenients served no piupnse hui tn
get another "bite of the apple" after failing to produce enough evidence at the hearing (R.
122:

»e court noted the State wanted the court to "give the State a second chance

o n a hearing that w a s set a n d mi , n o i n i i r n i s dial w e i e m a d e , a n d after hearing m y ruling
a n d realizing the State didn't c o v e r everything the State w a n t s a second » iiiitiai n \' (H.

122: 5). As mentioned above, the State's request for rehearing was a motion to
reconsider a final order because the suppression effectively ended the case.
This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if the
trial court clearly abused its broad discretion. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^ 65, 114
P.3d 551, State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, If 50, 108 P.3d 730, State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220
(Utah 1985). In this case there was no abuse of discretion because the additional
evidence the State sought to admit in a new suppression hearing was not newly
discovered. It could have been produced to the trial court at several points during the
pendency of Bozung's motion to suppress. The State failed to produce the evidence in
any timely fashion and the trial court's denial of the motion was within the court's
discretion.
ii. Any error was not obvious
An error is obvious only if "the law governing the error was clear at the time the
alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^j 16, 95 P.3d 276 (no obvious error
because the law at the time the defendant entered his plea was not settled as to the
requirement that defendant be informed he had the right to "a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury" as opposed to the right to a "trial by jury"). A trial court's error is not
obvious when "there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross,
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Ut.App. 1997) (cited with approval in State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \
16). The State's claims that the trial court's error in applying Rule 24 to the State's
motion for rehearing is obvious because Utah case law on the matter is "well-established"
but upon closer examination. Appellant's Brief at 25. Bozung asserts that the law is far
16

from settled in regards to this issue of what stain l;ird %txiuU applv io a trial court's
analysis of whether to grant a motion for rehearing of an evidentiary matter.
he State cites Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah
1980). L>ui this case stands io*

iiscretio

u< ,,\ the request to reopen a

trial made during the trial. In Gardner the plaintiff, during a una o<
damages, rested at Uuu A ithout submitting evidence of attorneys' fees. "At the beginning
of his closing arguinnih pLnn/iffs coun-

' > reopen for the purpose of

presenting himself as a witness to prove these fees" ;uul tlr rouri denied (In 'MMIIDM
Gardner, 622 P.2d at 784. This Court ruled that "a motion to reopen to take additional
e\ iilciuv is ;KUI,'SSI',I In I he soi md discretion of the Court[,]" however, Gardner would
not serve as establishing a precedent ii

•••* .i -. because it dealt

with a motion to reopen a trial made during closing arguments of the trial.
1

his case moved to rehear after a motion u- suppress was filed (R. 39,

October 30, 2007), after an evident mrv Iieai ing was held I h\ I v3 h alter further briefing
by the parties (R. 54, 65), after a status hearing (R. 120), and <iltei oi.il .irjuiin^nis wcte
made (k u I ;l) J! 1) Not until after all this evidence and argument was presented and the
court ruled did the state (hen inpu^i n

. ail lliis other evidence (P

nn

*) Tn this

situation it is unlikely that Gardner would have served as ob\ IOUS oi semen piei edenl
upon the trial court. See also Ross v. Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71, 377 P.2d 495, 497 (1963)
(case diMiiiNsed «ii imal Un l<n k of evidence, the trial court's denial of amotion to reopen
at trial was ruled an abuse of discretion), Shite r, Sir/, 8? / 1* 2d M"v4, (><>J {I H.Ap
(upheld the trial court's granting of the State's motion to reopen trial after judge
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dismissed a charge following the presentation of the State's evidence). Although these
cases represent a trial court's discretion to reopen trials to present new evidence before
the trial was over they are not well-settled on the issue the trial court in this case was
presented and thus would not serve as settled law on the matter before Judge Laycock so
as to make her application of Rule 24 an obvious error.
The State also cites State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942) on
this same proposition but the facts seem to suggest that the principles of Rule 24 suit it
better than the discretion standard the State is suggesting. In Duncan the jury had retired
to deliberate in a hit and run charge when a witness who had been subpoenaed by the
prosecution, but who was not called to testify, approached defense counsel with
exculpatory evidence. Duncan, 132 P.2d at 123. The defendant then moved to recall the
jury and reopen the case and the court denied the motion. Id. This Court reversed based
on the newly discovered evidence standard, much like the standard applied by Judge
Laycock (R. 87). The witness's evidence could not "have been discovered by defendant
and introduced at the trial unless the court had permitted defendant to reopen the case"
and "[i]t was not discovered until after the jury retired to commence deliberations." Id. at
124. Again this case fails to set precedent for the trial court in this case and fails to show
obvious error. If anything, it supports the trial court's application of Rule 24 in this
matter.
Without addressing the State's other cited case, the rest of which are more than 60
years old and as removed in applicability as Gardner, Ross, Seel and Duncan, Bozung
simply asserts that, contrary to the State's claim, the trial court did not ignore well1Q

established case law when it applied Rule 24 to the State's motion for rehearing. At very
least the law was not clear as to what standard applied to a motion for reopening a
Su

• <

-

•

• ng.

Even if, as the State suggests, "a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue
have rejected the" newly discovered evidence standard Utah case law is unsettled and the
ti I a. 1 coi Jit's review oft! ic i i lajority position would not have required it to use the
discretion standard under Ross. Appellant's Brief a I M>

I In- in.il i null * .ipplu ,ilnm n.f

Rule 24 was supported by case law (State v. Gardner, 23 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2001) and
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)) and was not contrary to
any settled Utah .ijipclL-ilc l;t>i un ihr www

Vvnnlnii'h

in nilnn' n.n an cum

iln iii'or

was not obvious, and thus the State cannot establish plain error.
iii if the trial court plainly erred the appropriate remedy is remand
If 1:1 me ti 1 a.I coi n 1: plaii il) ei i eel 1:1 ICI I tl lis Coi n t's i ei i leciy shot ild be to remand the
matter for reconsideration by the trial court using the correct standam. i ne State
requested this Court to r e m a n d "this matter to the trial court with an order to reopen the
suppressioi 11 leai it ig" based oi I tl le allegation that the trial court applied the wrcrr,
standard. Appellant's Brief at 3 3 . However, because the State's n 1 ' ^ ' : * ^ ^

i

court applied the wrong standard to the State's motion to reconsider, the remedy should
lie a niiiaiid w illi instn ictions to review the State's motion for rehearing under the proper
standard and not a ruling on (lit" tnulimi ilsell", Scr Molcr v < If htana^cmmi

( W'/1,,

2008 U T 46, 190 P.3d 1250 ("Because the district court applied the w r o n g standard, it did
not m a k e the necessary findings for us to conduct a review using the correct standar
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therefore we remand for the district court to make factual determinations and apply the
correct standard"). See also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 200 P.3d 662
("Ordinarily, when the district court applies the wrong legal standard the matter is
reversed and remanded so that the district court may consider the evidence under the
proper standard").

B. In any event the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's
Motion for Rehearing
The State has acknowledged the trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to reopen evidentiary matters. Appellant's Brief at 27. A trial court's discretion
extends to considerations of preparedness. Even before the suppression hearing the State
was on notice of the potential Miranda evidence because of the statements made by
Bozung on the tape (R. 126:13:38:15, "He just read me my rights"). The State was on
notice that the evidence of the alleged prior mirandizing would be relevant at the hearing
by Bozung's motion to suppress. The State was on notice at the hearing on November
21, 2007 that the alleged mirandizing was at issue when Moosman testified that he had no
personal knowledge of it (R. 113:15). At that time the trial court asked the parties if there
were any other witnesses or evidence and the State failed to offer it (R. 113:16). After
the hearing was completed and the briefs were submitted the State was on notice that
Bozung was challenging the adequacy of Moosman's warning. Finally, the State could
have requested to offer the evidence at the December 12, 2007 status hearing (R. 120) or
before the trail court made its ruling on January23, 2008 (R. 121:10). It is especially
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telling that when the court asked the parties for arguments on the motion to suppress the
State responded that the video was the best evidence At any point prior to the trial courts
ruling the State could have attempted to present this evidence. It is within the trial
court's discretion to consider these delays and deny the State's request. Even if the trial
court applied the wrong standard, it is clear from the record that the court was prone to
deny the State's request based on their failure to present the evidence that they had clear
notice would be relevant at the suppression hearing and throughout the suppression
process.
The State argues that a "broad spectrum of factors that should inform a trial
court's discretion when ruling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing" and then
discusses why these factors should have weighed in favor of reopening the hearing.
Appellant's Brief at 305 31.
Bozung contends that the factors just as readily weigh in favor of denying the
motion for rehearing:
One, the State claims that the nature of the case being a first degree felony and the
fact that suppression affected the State's ability to pursue those charges. Appellant's
Brief at 31. This factor could just as easily persuaded that trial court to wonder why the
State had been so unprepared for the suppression hearings when it had more than
adequate notice that Miranda was a seriously contested issue and from the very
beginning knew that Bozung could well have been given his rights by other Lehi police
officers.

21

Two, the timeliness of the motion and that reason for not presenting the evidence
at the first issue. The State claims that because the alleged Miranda warning was not at
issue in the original motion it cannot be blamed for failing to seek to provide additional
evidence at any time before the court ruled. However, the State had been put on notice
from the first filing of the motion to suppress that Bozung was challenging the efficacy
and adequacy of Moosman's recitation of the Miranda warnings along with the waiver of
those rights. The State also was aware from the initial receipt of an audiotape of
Moosman's interview with Bozung, prior to the filing of the motion to suppress, that
Bozung mentioned to Moosman that another officer had read him the rights (R. 113: 8).
Furthermore, at the suppression hearing Bozung questioned Moosman heavily on this
very point (R. 113: 15). Despite all of that, the State did not make any effort to put on
additional evidence on this issue while the motion to suppress was pending. Cf. State v.
James, 635 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wash. App. 1981) (At suppression hearing the trial court
raised a new issue. The State asked for a continuance and the trial court's refusal was
deemed an abuse of discretion).
Three, whether the evidence would have impacted the trial court's decision. The
State asserts that "in light of the trial court's ruling evidence concerning Defendant's first
Miranda warnings became crucial to the prosecutor's argument." Appellant's Brief at
32. Bozung concedes that the evidence may have impacted the trial court's decision.
However, the State was given ample opportunities to put into evidence the information it
now seeks. Almost immediately after Moosman was questioned by Bozung about this
other reading of Miranda rights, the trial court asked the parties, "Any other witnesses or
22

evidence we need to put on?" (R. 113: 16). The State was silent and made no attempt to
request time or opportunity to present the evidence they now claim is so important.
Additionally, they had other opportunities prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion to
suppress in which to seek admission of this testimony. However, they failed to do so.
The final factor mentioned is the impact of reopening on a trial court's resources
or docket. The State claims that there is no evidence in the record suggesting undue
interference with the trial court's resources or docket. Bozung asserts that the record
itself, and the fact that there were multiple hearings and conferences on the matter should
weigh at least as heavily toward denial as granting.
The State defends the prosecutors timing by mentioning that he moved to reopen
the suppression hearing within two days of the court's noting that the evidence was
relevant as if the prosecutor would have any question while a motion to suppress for a
failure to give Miranda warnings that evidence of an alleged mirandizing would be
relevant. The State's reluctance to produce such evidence, if it existed, as soon as the
motion to suppress was filed is inexcusable.
In State v. James, 635 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Wash App. 1981)—a case cited to by the
State—the Washington court stated, "Discretion is abused only where no reasonable man
would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the
propriety of the action taken by the trial court, it cannot be said the trial court abused its
discretion." Here, Bozung asserts that the trial court's decision not to allow the State to
reopen the suppression hearing in this case was not unreasonable nor an abuse of
discretion. The State had nearly three months and three hearings where it could have
23

provided the trial court with the information it now claims is so critical. Instead, they
waited until after the trial court had ruled to raise the issue of this evidence they had
known about from the beginning. The trial court has been given broad discretion to make
such a ruling, and she thoughtfully made it. Bozung accordingly asks that this Court
affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the State's motion for reconsideration of the
suppression issue.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the State has not shown that Bozung received an adequate recitation of
the Miranda rights the State's claim that he waived those rights is irrelevant.
Additionally, even if the trial court's factual findings are found to be clearly erroneous
and the alleged reading of the Admonition of Rights form served as an adequate warning,
the State has not overcome its heavy burden to proving that Bozung knowingly and
intentionally waived his Fifth Amendment rights. For these reasons Bozung requests the
Court to uphold the trial court's suppression of the evidence.
Because the State has failed to show that the trial court's application of Rule 24 to
the State's motion for rehearing was an obvious error, or was an abuse of discretion, this
Court should affirm. If the Court finds an obvious harmful error, this Court should
remand with instructions to the district court to apply the proper standard.

24

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 rd day of September, 2009.

Margaret P.Xindsay
Thomas H. Means
Counsel for Appellee

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the Brief of Appellee were mailed to Karen
Klucznik, Assistant Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor,
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 3 rd day of September, 2009.
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Thomas H. Means (2222)
UTAH
STATE pr.*>NTY
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
Historic Utah County Courthouse
51 South University Avenue
Provo, Utah, 84601
(801)852-1070
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DISTRICT No. 071402713
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, and ORDER SUPPRESSING
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS

GARETH BOZUNG,
Defendant.

Hon. Claudia Laycock

This matter came on for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Statement on the 23rd day of January, 2008. This Court, having reviewed the parties'
written memoranda and the CD recording of the subject interview and having given due
consideration to the arguments of the parties, now enters these:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On 1 May, 2007 Defendant was arrested and retained in custody by Lehi City
Police officers on charges unrelated to this case.
2. Detective Moosman of the Highland-Alpine Police Department interviewed
Defendant at the Lehi City Police Department while Defendant remained in custody.
3. The entire interview was visually and audibly recorded. A CD disk recording of
the interview has been admitted into evidence. From such recording the following
sequence of events is apparent to this Court.
4. When Defendant entered the interview room he appeared distraught and
concerned about unrelated personal family matters.
5. Det. Moosman engaged Defendant briefly about such family matters; another
officer brought Defendant a Mountain Dew to drink; Defendant was not handcuffed or
otherwise physically restrained; Defendant and Det. Moosman sat across from each
other at a table.
6. Before beginning the interrogation, Det. Moosman told Defendant that it was
necessary to go through his rights with him and explained "right here you do have the
right to remain silent, do you understand?"
7. Defendant responded "yea"
8. Det. Moosman passed Defendant a document and asked Defendant to initial
"number 1 saying you under stand that." The document that Det. Moosman was
2

referring to was the waiver of rights form that has been made an exhibit in the file of this
matter; the form does include written admonitions of all the rights that are required by
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Defendant accepted the form and said "I can just read it, he just read me my
rights."
10. Det. Moosman responded, "ok, that's fine, if you'll just read 'em and if you
understand 'em if youll initial 'em."
11. From this point forward Det. Moosman did not advise Defendant of his
further rights but allowed Defendant to apparently read the form and place his initials
beside certain paragraphs in sequences that are uncertain to this Court.
12. Simultaneous with Defendant's handling the form, he and Det. Moosman
continued to discuss matters unrelated to Defendant's constitutional rights including,
the sale of Defendant's family home, the soaring price of homes, a family dispute
concerning Defendant's use of his mother's prescription drugs, the fact that his father
feels he is selfish, that he has been kicked out of his house for his language, that he
hadn't use, (drugs) that day, and that a "kid" he met last night told him he doesn't use,
he only smokes weed and drinks beer. Defendant did not stop talking about these
unrelated issues during the entire time he looked over the form.
13. While Defendant handled the form and simultaneously talked about the
subjects noted above, Det. Moosman interjected, "sign right here", "now do you under
3

stand all this stuff?", "and if you understand and agree with it, sign there ... and I'll sign
as a witness".
14. This Court is unable to determine from the written form, the CD recording, or
the testimony elicited at the preliminary examination in what sequence Defendant
initialed the various places where his initials appear on the form, or whether Defendant
actually read the various admonitions on the form, much less whether Defendant
comprehended any of the admonitions.
15. It is clear to this Court that Defendant did not focus exclusively on the
admonitions written on the form.
16. It is clear to this Court that Defendant was distracted from the admonitions
on the form by the matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman.
17. It appears to this Court that Defendant signed the form voluntarily.
18. This Court is unable to determine from the evidence that //Defendant was in
fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether such
admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant, whether Defendant understood
each of such rights, or whether Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of
such rights.
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters these :

4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By a preponderance of evidence, this Court concludes that Det. Moosman did
not read from the form to Defendant or otherwise verbally advise Defendant that
anything Defendant said would be used against him in court, that Defendant had a right
to have an attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if
Defendant asked it to cease or asked for an attorney.
2. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant,
by his own reading of the written waiver of rights form, was adequately advised that
anything he said would be used against him in court, that he had a right to have an
attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if he asked it to
cease or asked for an attorney.
3. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that prior to the
interview by Det. Moosman, Defendant was previously adequately advised of his
Miranda rights by other police officers, that Defendant understood each of such rights,
or that Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of such rights.
4. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his
statements would be use against him in court, or knew that he could stop the
interrogation at any time.
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters this:
5

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that all of Defendant's statement made to Alpine-Highland
Det. Moosman on or about 1 May, 2007 at the Lehi City Police Department be and
hereby is suppressed and shall not be admitted as evidence at the trial of this matter.
Dated this

day of \<)oW^U^\
>rtcau>\ ^

. 2008.
By the Court:

ClaudiasLaycock Judge
^
FouilhJudicial .District Court
Approved as to form:

Craig JjbhV
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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JEFFREY R. BUHMAN (7041)
Utah County Attorney
CRAIG R. JOHNSON (10151)
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Tel. (801) 851-8026
Fax (801) 851-8051

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION FOR REHEARING ON
SUPPRESSION MOTION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARETHBOZUNG,

j

Case No. 071402713
Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendant.

1

Comes now the State, by and through counsel, Craig Johnson, and respectfully requests that
the Court allow a rehearing regarding the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, which was granted on
January 23,2008. The State would like to present evidence from the Lehi police officers who read
the Defendant his Miranda rights in another case before Detective Moosman attempted to Mirandize
the Defendant in this matter, both of which occurred at the Lehi Police Department minutes apart
on May 1,2007. This evidence is vital to giving the Court the full picture of what the Defendant was
referring to when he stated he had already been read his rights after Detective Moosman read him
his right to remain silent. Based on this additional testimony, the State would argue that the totality

of the circumstances demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant made a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutionally-guaranteed Miranda rights.

SIGNED this L I day of

Pgy^

, 2008.

Deputy/Jtah County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR REHEARING
ON SUPPRESSION MOTION was sent via inter-office mail, to the following:
Tom Means
Utah County Public Defender's Office
50 South University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84606
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Thomas H. Means (2222)
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
Historic Utah County Courthouse
51 South University Avenue
Provo, Utah, 84601
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(801)852-1070
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

DISTRICT No. 071402713

)

ORDER IN RE:
STATE'S MOTION
FOR REHEARING

)

GARETH BOZUNG,
Defendant.

)

Hon. Claudia Laycock

)

This matter came on before this Court on the 6th day of February, 2007, for
argument on the State's Motion for Rehearing of the Order Suppressing Defendant's
Admissions. The State was represented by Craig Johnson, Deputy Utah County
Attorney. Defendant appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of
record, Thomas H. Means. Having duly considered the parties' written and oral
arguments, this Court now enters the following findings:
1. The Utah Rules of Criminal Proceduredio not specifically provide for a Motion

a
for Rehearing.

1

2. A Motion to Reconsider is not specifically provided for in the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Neither are such motions recognized in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure1 (Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah, 1991)),
however they have been reviewed as if brought under some other proper rule and
simply mistitled. / d , at 1064-65.
3. The most closely appropriate rule of criminal procedure that would govern the
State's Motion for Rehearing on Suppression Motion would be Rule 24, Motion for New
Trial.
4. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the standard to be used when a
party seeks to introduce additional evidence in support of a motion for new trial. Such
evidence "must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered
and produced at the trial[.]" State v James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah, 1991).
5. This Court determines, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State was
aware of the possible existence of witnesses who could have provided evidence relative
to Defendant having been advised of his Miranda rights prior to being interviewed by
Detective Moosman.

x

See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81(e) making the civil rules of procedure
applicable in criminal cases "where there is no other applicable statute or rule ...."
2

* tjb - *!

6. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State
could not have produced, with reasonable diligence, such witnesses or other evidence
relative to the issue at this Court's original hearing on 23 January, 2008.
Upon the foregoing, this Court denies the State's Motion for Rehearing.
Dated this -L±- day of February, 2008.
By the CpjUfrt;-

faudia Layeopk
: Judge
*• Fourth Judicial District
Approved as to form:

i

i

Craig Jamison
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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